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Abstract
I argue that a criterion of theoretical equivalence due to Clark Glymour [Nouˆs 11(3), 227–
251 (1977)] does not capture an important sense in which two theories may be equivalent. I
then motivate and state an alternative criterion that does capture the sense of equivalence I
have in mind. The principal claim of the paper is that relative to this second criterion, the
answer to the question posed in the title is “yes”, at least on one natural understanding of
Newtonian gravitation.
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1. Introduction
Are Newtonian gravitation and geometrized Newtonian gravitation (Newton-Cartan Theory)
equivalent theories? Clark Glymour (1970, 1977, 1980) has articulated a natural criterion
of theoretical equivalence and argued that, by this criterion, the answer is “no”.1 I will
argue here that the situation is more subtle than Glymour suggests, by characterizing a
robust sense in which two theories may be equivalent that Glymour’s criterion does not
capture. This alternative sense of equivalence, which is in the same spirit as Glymour’s,
is best construed as a friendly amendment. Still, it will turn out that by this alternative
criterion, Newtonian gravitation is equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation—at
Email address: weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1Glymour’s criterion has recently been a topic of debate on other grounds: see, for instance, Halvorson
(2012, 2013), Glymour (2013), and Coffey (2014).
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least on one way of construing Newtonian gravitation.2 It follows that there exist realistic
theories that are equivalent in a robust and precise sense, but which apparently disagree
regarding certain basic features of the world, such as whether spacetime is flat or curved.
The paper will proceed as follows. I will begin by briefly reviewing the two versions of
Newtonian gravitation. I will then describe Glymour’s criterion for theoretical equivalence,
according to which the two versions of Newtonian gravitation fail to be equivalent. Next, I
will apply Glymour’s criterion to two formulations of electromagnetism that, I will argue,
should be (and typically are) taken to be equivalent. It will turn out that these theories
fail to be equivalent by Glymour’s criterion of equivalence. In the following sections, I will
develop an alternative notion of equivalence between theories that I will argue does capture
the sense in which these two formulations of electromagnetism are equivalent. I will then
return to the question of principal interest in the present paper, arguing that there are
two ways of construing standard (nongeometrized) Newtonian gravitation. I will state and
prove a simple proposition to the effect that, by the alternative criterion, on one of the two
ways of construing standard Newtonian gravitation (but not the other), it is theoretically
equivalent to geometrized Newtonian gravitation. I will conclude by drawing some morals
concerning the interpretation of physical theories. Proofs of selected propositions appear in
an appendix.
2. Two formulations of Newtonian gravitation
The two theories with which I am principally concerned are Newtonian gravitation (NG)
and a variant of Newtonian gravitation due to E´lie Cartan (1923, 1924) and Kurt Friedrichs
(1927), called “Newton-Cartan theory” or “geometrized Newtonian gravitation” (GNG).3 In
NG, gravitation is a force exerted by massive bodies on other massive bodies. It is mediated
2David Zaret (1980) has also replied to Glymour on this question. But his argument is markedly different
than the one presented here, and Spirtes and Glymour (1982) offer what I take to be an effective reply.
3For background on geometrized Newtonian gravitation, see Malament (2012) or Trautman (1965).
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by a gravitational potential, and in the presence of a (non-constant) gravitational potential,
massive bodies will accelerate. In GNG, meanwhile, gravitation is “geometrized” in much
the same way as in general relativity: the geometrical properties of spacetime depend on
the distribution of matter, and conversely, gravitational effects are manifestations of this
geometry. Despite these differences, however, there is a precise sense, which I will state
below, in which the theories are empirically equivalent. The central question of the paper
is whether they are also equivalent in some stronger sense.
On both theories, spacetime is represented by a four dimensional manifold, which I will
assume throughout is contractible. This manifold is equipped with two (degenerate) metrics:
a temporal metric tab that assigns temporal lengths to vectors, and a spatial metric h
ab that
(indirectly) assigns spatial lengths to vectors.4 These are required to satisfy habtbc = 0
everywhere. There always exists (at least locally) a covector field ta such that tab = tatb; in
cases where the spacetime is “temporally orientable”, this field can be defined globally. In
what follows, I will limit attention to temporally orientable spacetimes. Finally, we assume
spacetime is endowed with a derivative operator ∇ that is compatible with both metrics, in
the sense that ∇atbc = 0 and ∇ahbc = 0 everywhere. These four elements together define
a classical spacetime, written (M, ta, h
ab,∇). Matter in both theories is represented by its
mass density field, which is a smooth scalar field ρ. Massive point particles are represented
by their worldlines—smooth curves whose tangent vector fields ξa satisfy ξata 6= 0. Such
curves are called timelike.
In this context, NG is the theory whose models are classical spacetimes with flat (Rabcd =
0) derivative operators, endowed with a gravitational potential, which is a scalar field ϕ
satisfying Poisson’s equation, ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ.5 A massive point particle whose worldline
has tangent field ξa will accelerate according to ξn∇nξa = −∇aϕ. In the geometrized
4Throughout the paper I use the abstract index notation, explained in Malament (2012, §1.4).
5Here ∇aϕ = hab∇bϕ.
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version of the theory, meanwhile, the derivative operator is permitted to be curved and the
gravitational potential is omitted. The curvature field associated with the derivative operator
satisfies a geometrized version of Poisson’s equation, Rab = 4piρtatb, and in the absence of any
external (i.e., non-gravitational) interactions, massive particles traverse timelike geodesics of
this curved derivative operator. In both cases, we take the “empirical content” of the theory
to consist in the allowed trajectories of massive bodies, given a particular mass density.
Given a model of NG, it is always possible to produce a (unique) model of GNG that
agrees on empirical content in this sense.
Proposition 2.1 (Trautman (1965)). Let (M, ta, h
ab,
f
∇) be a flat classical spacetime, let
ϕ and ρ be smooth scalar fields satisfying Poisson’s equation with respect to
f
∇, and let
g
∇ = (
f
∇, Cabc), with Cabc = −tbtc
f
∇ aϕ.6 Then (M, ta, hab,
g
∇) is a classical spacetime;
g
∇ is
the unique derivative operator on M such that given any timelike curve with tangent vector
field ξa, ξn
g
∇nξa = 0 iff ξn
f
∇nξa = −
f
∇ aϕ; and the Riemann curvature tensor relative to
g
∇,
g
R abcd, satisfies (1)
g
Rab = 4piρtatb, (2)
g
Rab
c
d =
g
Rcd
a
b, and (3)
g
Rabcd = 0.
It is also possible to go in the other direction, as follows.
Proposition 2.2 (Trautman (1965)). Let (M, ta, h
ab,
g
∇) be a classical spacetime that sat-
isfies conditions (1)-(3) in Prop. 2.1 for some smooth scalar field ρ. Then there exists a
smooth scalar field ϕ and a flat derivative operator
f
∇ such that (M, ta, hab,
f
∇) is a clas-
sical spacetime; given any timelike curve with tangent vector field ξa, ξn
g
∇nξa = 0 iff
ξn
f
∇nξa = −
f
∇ aϕ; and ϕ and ρ together satisfy Poisson’s equation relative to
f
∇.
It is important emphasize that the pair (
f
∇, ϕ) in Prop. 2.2 is not unique. A second
pair (
f
∇′, ϕ′) will satisfy the same conditions provided that (1) ∇a∇b(ϕ′ − ϕ) = 0 and (2)
f
∇′ = (
f
∇, Cabc), with Cabc = tbtc∇a(ϕ′−ϕ). Note, too, that Prop. 2.2 holds only if conditions
(1)-(3) from Prop. 2.1 are satisfied. The geometrized Poisson equation, condition (1), has
already been assumed to hold of models of GNG; for present purposes, I will limit attention
to models of GNG that also satisfy conditions (2) and (3).
6The notation ∇′ = (∇, Cabc) is explained in Malament (2012, Prop. 1.7.3).
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3. Glymour on theoretical equivalence
I will now turn to Glymour’s account of theoretical equivalence. The underlying intuition
is that two theories are theoretically equivalent if (1) the are empirically equivalent and
(2) they are mutually inter-translatable.7 In general, empirical equivalence is a slippery
concept, but we will not discuss it further. For present purposes, it suffices to stipulate that
the theories being compared are empirically equivalent, in the precise senses described.
Glymour makes the second condition, of mutual inter-translatability, precise via the
notion of definitional equivalence in first order logic.8 Suppose that L and L+ are first-
order signatures, with L ⊆ L+. An explicit definition of a symbol in L+ in terms of L is a
sentence in L+ that asserts the equivalence between that symbol (appropriately used) and
some formula in L. Given a theory T in L, by appending explicit definitions of the symbols
in L+/L to T , we may extend T to a theory in L+. The resulting theory is a definitional
extension of T in L+. Now suppose T1 and T2 are first-order theories in signatures L1 and
L2, respectively, with L1∩L2 = ∅. Then T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent if and only if
there are first order theories T+1 and T
+
2 in L1∪L2 such that T+1 is a definitional extension of
T1, T
+
2 is a definitional extension of T2, and T
+
1 and T
+
2 are logically equivalent. Definitional
equivalence captures a sense of inter-translatability in that, given any pair of definitionally
equivalent theories T1 and T2 and a formula % in the language of T1, it is always possible
to translate % into a formula in the language of T2, and then back into a formula in the
language of T1 that is T1−provably equivalent to %.
Definitional equivalence is a natural notion of equivalence for first order theories. But it is
difficult to apply to physical theories, since we rarely have first order formulations available.
7Glymour does not state that empirical equivalence is a necessary condition for theoretical equivalence,
though he does appear to take theoretical equivalence to be strictly stronger than empirical equivalence,
and, as Sklar (1982) emphasizes, empirical equivalence is a substantive interpretive constraint that goes
beyond any formal relations between two theories.
8For details on explicit definability and definitional equivalence, see Hodges (1993, Ch. 2.6). See also the
classic work by de Bouvere (1965b,a).
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For this reason, Glymour works with a model-theoretic variant of definitional equivalence.
Suppose T1 and T2 are definitionally equivalent theories, and suppose that A1 is a model
of T1. Then it is always possible to expand A1 into a model A of T
+
1 , the definitional
extension of T1. Since T
+
1 and T
+
2 (the extension of T2) are logically equivalent, A is also
a model of T+2 . We may thus turn A into a model A2 of T2 by restricting A to symbols in
the language of T2. The whole process can then be reversed to recover A1. In this sense,
definitionally equivalent theories “have the same models” insofar as a model of one theory
can be systematically transformed into a model of the other theory, and vice versa.9
Using this model-theoretic characterization of definitional equivalence as inspiration,
Glymour proposes the following criterion of equivalence for physical theories expressed in
terms of covariant objects on a manifold.10
Criterion 1. Theories T1 and T2 are theoretically equivalent if for every model M1 in T1,
there exists a unique model M2 in T2 that (1) has the same empirical content as M1 and (2)
is such that the geometrical objects associated with M2 are uniquely and covariantly definable
in terms of the elements of M1 and the geometrical objects associated with M1 are uniquely
and covariantly definable in terms of M2, and vice versa.
GNG and NG fail to meet this criterion. The reason is that, although it is always possible
given a model M1 of NG to uniquely and covariantly define a model M2 of GNG, it is not
possible to go in the other direction: given M2, there are many corresponding models of NG.
4. A problem case for Glymour?
I will presently argue that criterion 1 does not capture an important sense in which two
theories may be equivalent. I will do so by displaying two “theories” (actually, formulations
of a single theory) that usually are (I claim correctly) taken to be equivalent, but which fail
9It is essential that one can go from a model A1 of T1 to a model A2 of T2, and then back to the same
model A1 of T1. See Andre´ka et al. (2005).
10Actually, all Glymour claims is that clause (2) of this criterion is a necessary condition for theoretical
equivalence. I am extrapolating when I say that the two clauses together are also sufficient.
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to meet Glymour’s criterion. These theories correspond to two ways of presenting classical
electromagnetism on Minkowski spacetime, (M, ηab).
11
On the first formulation of the theory, which I will call EM1, the dynamical variable a
smooth, antisymmetric tensor field Fab on M . This field is called the Faraday tensor; it
represents the electromagnetic field on spacetime. The Faraday tensor satisfies Maxwell’s
equations, which may be written as (1) ∇[aFbc] = 0 and (2) ∇aF ab = J b, where J b is a
smooth vector field representing charge-current density. (Here∇ is the Levi-Civita derivative
operator compatible with ηab.) Models on this formulation may be written (M, ηab, Fab). On
the second formulation, which I will call EM2, the dynamical variable is a smooth vector
field Aa on M , called the 4−vector potential. This field satisfies the differential equation
∇a∇aAb −∇b∇aAa = J b. Models may be written (M, ηab, Aa).
These two formulations are systemically related. Given a vector potential Aa on M , one
may define a Faraday tensor by Fab = ∇[aAb]. This tensor will satisfy Maxwell’s equations
for some Ja if Aa satisfies the differential equation above for the same J
a. Conversely,
given a Faraday tensor Fab satisfying Maxwell’s equations (for some J
a), there always exists
a vector potential Aa satisfying the required differential equation (for that J
a), such that
Fab = ∇[aAb]. We stipulate that on both formulations, the empirical content of a model
is exhausted by its associated Faraday tensor. In this sense, the theories are empirically
equivalent, since for any model of EM1, there is a corresponding model of EM2 with the
same empirical content (for some fixed Ja), and vice versa.
But are EM1 and EM2 equivalent by Glymour’s criterion? No. Given any model
(M, ηab, Aa) of EM2, I can uniquely and covariantly define a model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1
by taking Fab = ∇[aAb]. But given a model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1, there are generally many
corresponding models of EM2. In particular, if Fab = ∇[aAb] for some 4-vector potential Aa,
11Minkowski spacetime is a (fixed) relativistic spacetime (M,ηab) where M is R4, ηab is a flat Lorentzian
metric, and the spacetime is geodesically complete.
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then Fab = ∇[aA˜b] will also hold if (and only if) A˜a = Aa + Ga, where Ga is a closed one
form (i.e., ∇[aGb] = 0). Thus unique definability fails in the EM2 to EM1 direction.
What should one make of this result? On the one hand, Glymour’s criterion seems to
capture something important: the failure of uniqueness suggests that EM2 distinguishes
physical situations that EM1 cannot distinguish. On the other hand, EM1 and EM2 are
usually taken to be different formulations of the same theory; they are intended to have
precisely the same theoretical content. The tension concerns the relationship between the
models of EM2. The transformations between models of EM2 associated with the same
Faraday tensor are often called “gauge transformations”. On their standard interpretation,
models related by a gauge transformation are physically equivalent, in the sense that they
have the capacity to represent precisely the same physical situations.12 Thus EM2 does not
distinguish situations that EM1 cannot. And indeed, it seems to me that there is a clear and
robust sense in which two theories should be understood as equivalent if, on their standard
interpretations, they differ only with regard to features that, by the lights of the theories
themselves, have no physical content.
5. An alternative criterion
Thus far, I have introduced a criterion of theoretical equivalence and argued that it fails
to capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. In the present section, I will
present a criterion of equivalence that does capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are
equivalent. To motivate this new criterion, note first that there are actually two reasons
that EM1 and EM2 fail to meet Glymour’s criterion. The first concerns the failure of a
model of EM1 to correspond to a unique model of EM2. The second problem concerns
“covariantly definability”. Though the Faraday tensor Fab is always definable in terms of
a vector potential, in general there is no way to define a vector potential in terms of a
12The status of the vector potential arguably changes in quantum mechanics. See Belot (1998).
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covariant formula involving the Faraday tensor. Rather, one has general existence results
guaranteeing that an associated vector potential must exist.
I will begin with the uniqueness problem. If we want a sense of theoretical equivalence
that captures the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent to one another, we need to be
able to accommodate the possibility that not all of the structure of models of EM2 is salient.
That is, we want a sense of unique recovery up to physical equivalence. One way to make
this idea precise is to modify our definition of models of EM2. Instead of characterizing
a model as a triple (M, ηab, Aa), we may take a model to be a triple (M, ηab, [Aa]), where
[Aa] is the equivalence class of physically equivalent vector potentials, [Aa] = {A˜a : A˜a =
Aa +Ga for closed Ga}. This approach explicitly equivocates between physically equivalent
vector potentials. Call the theory whose models are so characterized EM′2.
Proposition 5.1. For any model (M, ηab, Fab) of EM1, there is a unique model (M, ηab, [Aa])
of EM′2 such that Fab = daXa for every Xa ∈ [Aa].
Thus we do have unique recovery of models of EM′2 from models of EM1.
We still face the second problem, however, since it is still not clear that there is an
expression by which we may covariantly define an equivalence class [Aa] in terms of an
antisymmetric tensor Fab. To address this problem, we return to first order logic. In that
context, a classic result known as Svenonius’ theorem that states (roughly) that a relation
is (explicitly) definable in a first order theory just in case the relation is invariant under the
automorphisms of the models of that theory (see Hodges, 1993, §5.10). This result provides
an alternative model-theoretic characterization of definitional equivalence. Of course, as in
our discussion of Glymour’s criterion, we cannot apply the new characterization directly.
But it does suggest an alternative way of adapting definitional equivalence to the present
context, by using the invariance properties of the models of our theories. Indeed, there
is a sense in which Glymour’s characterization in terms of covariant definability already
incorporates an invariance requirement of precisely this sort, since covariance amounts to a
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condition on how objects behave under diffeomorphisms.
These considerations suggest the following idea. Instead of requiring explicit covariant
definability, we require that the geometrical objects characterizing models of two theories
be invariant under the same diffeomorphisms.
Proposition 5.2. Let (M, ηab, Fab) and (M, ηab, F
′
ab) be models of EM1 and let (M, ηab, [Aa])
and (M, ηab, [Aa]
′) be the unique corresponding models of EM′2. If χ : M →M is an isometry
such that χ∗(Fab) = F ′ab, then [χ∗(Aa)] = [Aa]
′.13
This result provides a sense in which the models of EM′2 might be said to be implicitly
definable from the models of EM1. Putting Props. 5.1 and 5.2 together, meanwhile, (almost)
captures the sense in which EM1 and EM
′
2 are equivalent.
It would be desirable to abstract away from this specific case and articulate a more general
criterion. To do so, observe that the relationship between EM1 and EM
′
2 that is captured
by Props. 5.1 and 5.2 concerns not only the models, but also maps between the models—
namely, the diffeomorphisms that preserve the structure of the models. This suggests that we
might be able to extract a general criterion of equivalence by representing these theories not
as collections of models, but as categories of models.14 That is, we define a category EM1
whose objects are models of EM1 and whose arrows are isometries of Minkowski spacetime
that preserve the Faraday tensor, and a category EM′2 whose objects are models of EM
′
2 and
whose arrows are isometries of Minkowski spacetime that preserve the equivalence classes of
vector potentials, as in Prop. 5.2.
Given these categories, we may then prove the following result.
Corollary 5.3. There exists an isomorphism of categories between EM1 and EM2 that
preserves empirical content.
Prop. 5.3 captures the sense of equivalence given by the conjunction of Props. 5.1 and 5.2,
but it is slightly stronger: it says not only that the corresponding models of EM1 and EM2
13Here χ∗ is the pushforward along χ, defined for differential forms because χ is a diffeomorphism.
14For more on this proposal, see Halvorson (2012) and Halvorson and Weatherall (2015); for more on
categories and functors, see Mac Lane (1998), Awodey (2006), or Borceux (2008), among many other
excellent texts.
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are invariant under the same diffeomorphisms, but also that those invariances are compatible
with what might be thought of as the algebraic structure of the diffeomorphisms.
Prop. 5.3 suggests the following new criterion of equivalence.
Criterion 1′. Two theories are theoretically equivalent just in case there exists an isomor-
phism between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
I call this criterion 1′ because it bears a very close relationship to Glymour’s original criterion.
In effect, all we have done is move from one version of the definability clause of criterion 1 to
another—equivalent in first order logic—to generate a criterion that is a bit more convenient
to use in the present context. This is not to say the resulting criteria are the same—as we
have seen, criterion 1′ is strictly weaker than 1, since EM1 and EM′2 are equivalent by
criterion 1′ and not by criterion 1—but rather to say that both are motivated by the same
basic intuition, implemented in different ways.
I claim that criterion 1′ and Cor. 5.3 capture the sense in which EM1 and EM′2 are
equivalent theories. But what about EM2, the alternative formulation of electromagnetism
we began with? After all, it was this theory that we originally wanted to claim was equivalent
to EM1. We may define a category of models of this theory, too: as a first pass, we take
EM2 to be the category whose objects are models of EM2 and whose arrows are isometries of
Minkowski spacetime that preserve the vector potential. But this category is not isomorphic
to EM1—and so, on this representation of EM2, EM1 and EM2 are still not equivalent, even
by criterion 1′. The problem is the same as with Glymour’s criterion: roughly speaking,
there is a failure of uniqueness.
We have already argued that this sort of non-uniqueness is spurious, at least on the
standard interpretation of EM2, because models related by a gauge transformation should
be counted as physically equivalent. The category EM2 does not reflect this equivalence
between models, because in general, two models that differ by a gauge transformation will
not be isomorphic in this category. On the other hand, we also know that there is another
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class of mapping between models that does reflect this sort of physical equivalence—namely,
the gauge transformations themselves. These maps do not appear as arrows in the category
EM2, which suggests that if we want to represent EM2 accurately, in the sense of representing
it in a way that accords with what structure we take to be physically significant on the
standard interpretation, we need a different category, one that includes information about
the gauge transformations.
We define such a category as follows: we take EM2 to be the category whose objects are
models of EM2 and whose arrows are pairs of the form (χ,Ga), where Ga is closed and χ is
an isometry that preserves the (gauge transformed) vector potential Aa +Ga.
Proposition 5.4. EM2 is a category.
Note that EM2 is naturally understood to include the arrows of EM1, which may be iden-
tified with pairs of the form (χ, 0), the gauge transformations, which are arrows of the form
(1M , Ga), and compositions of these.
Intuitively speaking, EM2 is the result of taking EM2 and “adding” arrows correspond-
ing to the gauge transformations. Simply adding arrows in this way, however, does not yield
a category that is (empirical-content-preservingly) isomorphic to EM1. The reason is that
the extra arrows do not address the failure of unique recovery. But that does not mean this
exercise was in vain. Although there is not an isomorphism between EM1 and EM2 that
preserves empirical content, there is an equivalence of categories that does so.
Proposition 5.5. There is an equivalence of categories between EM1 and EM2 that pre-
serves empirical content.
Equivalent categories may be thought of as categories that are isomorphic “up to object
isomorphism”—which is precisely the notion of equivalence we argued we were looking for
between EM1 and EM2 at the end of the last section.
The considerations in the last paragraph suggest a new, still weaker criterion.
Criterion 2. Two theories are theoretically equivalence just in case there exists an equiva-
lence between their categories of models that preserves empirical content.
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Prop. 5.5 establishes that EM1 and EM2 are theoretically equivalent by this new criterion—
so long as we represent EM2 by EM2, rather than EM2. It is in this sense, I claim, that
the two formulations of electromagnetism should be taken to be equivalent.
As a final remark, let me observe that criterion 2 also captures the sense in which EM2
and EM′2 are equivalent. In particular, these theories are not equivalent by criterion 1
′, even
though EM′2 and EM2 may seem to be equally good ways of capturing “gauge equivalence”
in a formal representation of EM2. This fact reflects the more general fact that for most
mathematical purposes, equivalence of categories is a more natural and fruitful notion of
“sameness” of categories than isomorphism. It also suggests that criterion 1′ is at best an
awkward half-way point once we have begun thinking in the present terms.
6. Are NG and GNG theoretically equivalent?
With these new criteria in hand, we now return to the question at the heart of the paper.
To apply either criterion to NG and GNG, however, one first needs to say what categories
we will use to represent the theories. For GNG, there is a clear choice. We represent GNG
by the category GNG whose objects are classical spacetimes (M, ta, h
ab,∇) satisfying the
required curvature conditions from Prop. 2.1, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that
preserve the classical metrics and the derivative operator.15
NG is more complicated, however. There is a natural option for the objects: they are
classical spacetimes with gravitational potentials (M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ), where ∇ flat. But we
face a choice concerning the arrows, corresponding to a choice about which models of NG
are physically equivalent.
Option 1. One takes models of NG that differ with regard to the gravitational potential to
be distinct.
15Given a diffeomorphism χ : M →M ′ and derivative operators ∇ and ∇′ on M and M ′ respectively, we
say that χ preserves ∇ if for any tensor field λa1···arb1···bs on M , χ∗(∇nλa1···arb1···bs ) = ∇′nχ∗(λa1···arb1···bs ).
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Option 2. One takes models of NG whose gravitational potential and derivative operators
are related by the transformation ϕ 7→ ϕ′ = ϕ + ψ and ∇ 7→ ∇′ = (∇, tbtc∇aψ),
for any smooth ψ satisfying ∇a∇bψ = 0, to be equivalent.16
In the second case, one takes the gravitational potential to be a gauge quantity, much like
the vector potential in electromagnetism. In the first case, one does not.
These two options suggest different categories. In particular, we define NG1 to be the
category whose objects are as above, and whose arrows are diffeomorphisms that preserve
the classical metrics, the derivative operator, and the gravitational potential, and we define
NG2 to be the category with the same objects, but whose arrows are pairs (χ, ψ), where
ψ is a smooth scalar field satisfying ∇a∇bψ = 0, and χ is a diffeomorphism that preserves
the classical metrics and the (gauge transformed) derivative operator ∇′ = (∇, tbtc∇aψ)
and gravitational potential ϕ + ψ. The first category corresponds to option 1, while the
second corresponds to option 2. Since these options correspond to different interpretations
of the formalism, I will treat them as prima facie distinct theories, labeled as NG1 and NG2,
respectively, in what follows.
What considerations might lead one to prefer one option over the other? The first option
better reflects how physicists have traditionally thought of Newtonian gravitation. On the
other hand, this option appears to distinguish between models that are not empirically
distinguishable, even in principle. Moreover, there are systems in which option 1 leads to
problems, such as cosmological models with homogeneous and isotropic matter distributions,
where option 1 generates contradictions that option 2 avoids.17 These latter arguments strike
me as compelling, and I tend to agree with the conclusion that option 2 is preferable. But I
will not argue further for this thesis, and for the purposes of the present paper, I will remain
agnostic about which way of understanding NG is preferable.
16Note that, since all of the derivative operators considered in NG and GNG agree once one raises their
index, one can characterize the gauge transformation with regard to any of them without ambiguity.
17For more on this, see the debate between John Norton (1992, 1995) and David Malament (1995).
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Condition 1′ Condition 2
NG1 and NG2 Inequivalent Inequivalent
NG1 and GNG Inequivalent Inequivalent
NG2 and GNG Inequivalent Equivalent
Table 1: A summary of the equivalences and inequivalences of NG and GNG, by the standards set by
conditions 1′ and 2.
We may now ask: are any of these theories pairwise equivalent by either criterion? None
of these theories are equivalent by criterion 1′, effectively for the reason that NG and GNG
fail to be equivalent by Glymour’s original criterion.18 Moreover, NG1 is not equivalent to
either GNG or NG2 by criterion 2. But GNG and NG2 are equivalent by criterion 2.
Proposition 6.1. There is an equivalence of categories between NG2 and GNG that pre-
serves empirical content.
The situation is summarized by table 1.
7. Interpreting physical theories: some morals
I have now made the principal arguments of the paper. In short, criterion 1 does not capture
the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. However, there is a natural alternative
criterion that does capture the sense in which EM1 and EM2 are equivalent. And by this
criterion, GNG and NG are equivalent too, if one adopts option 2 above. Moreover, criterion
2 highlights an important distinction between two ways of understanding NG.
There are a few places where one might object. One might say that no formal criterion
captures what it would mean for two theories to be equivalent.19 One might also reject the
significance of the particular criteria discussed here. I do not agree with these objections,
but I will not consider them further. For the remainder of this paper, I will suppose that
18Note, however, that one could construct an alternative presentation of NG2 analogous to EM
′
2, in such
a way that this would be equivalent to GNG by criterion 1′. Moreover, if one restricts attention to the
collections of models of NG and GNG in which (1) the matter distribution is supported on a spatially
compact region and (2) the gravitational field (for models of NG) vanishes at spatial infinity, then NG1,
NG2, and GNG are all equivalent by both criteria.
19For versions of this worry, see Sklar (1982) and Coffey (2014).
15
criterion 2 does capture an interesting and robust sense in which these theories may be
equivalent. If this is right, there are several observations to make.
First of all, the arguments here support one of Glymour’s principal claims, which is that
there exist empirically equivalent, theoretically inequivalent theories. This is because even
if NG2 and GNG are theoretically equivalent, NG1 and GNG are still inequivalent, even
by condition 2. Glymour’s further claim that GNG is better supported by the empirical
evidence, on his account of confirmation, is only slightly affected, in that one needs to
specify that GNG is only better supported than NG1. This makes sense: the reason, on
Glymour’s account, that GNG is better supported than NG is supposed to be that NG
makes additional, unsupported ontological claims regarding the existence of a gravitational
potential. But one can understand the difference between NG1 and NG2 in this way as well,
since NG2 explicitly equivocates between models that differ with regard to their gravitational
potentials.
There is another purpose to which Glymour puts these arguments, however. There is
a view, originally due to Poincare´ (1905) and Reichenbach (1958), that the geometrical
properties of spacetime are a matter of convention because there always exist empirically
equivalent theories that differ with regard to (for instance) whether spacetime is curved or
flat.20 Glymour argues against conventionalism by pointing out that the empirical equiva-
lence of two theories does not imply that they are equally well confirmed, since the theories
may be theoretically inequivalent. But the present discussion suggests that there is an-
other possibility that is not often considered: theories that attribute apparently distinct
geometrical properties to the world may be more than just empirically equivalent.
As I have just noted, one way of understanding NG2 is as a theory on which the gravita-
tional potential is not a real feature of the world, because the gravitational potential is not
20For a clear and detailed description of the positions that have been defended on the epistemology of
geometry in the past, see Sklar (1977); see also Weatherall and Manchak (2014).
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preserved by mappings that reflect physical equivalence. GNG, meanwhile, does not make
any reference to a gravitational potential. In this sense GNG and NG2 appear to have the
same ontological implications, at least with regard to gravitational potentials. Still, GNG
and NG2 do differ in one important way. In particular, in all models of NG2, spacetime is
flat. In generic models of GNG, conversely, spacetime may be curved. Thus, at least in
this context, there is a sense in which classical spacetime admits equally good, theoretically
equivalent descriptions as either curved or flat.21
Let me emphasize that this view is not a recapitulation of traditional conventionalism
about geometry. For one, it is not a general claim about spacetime geometry; the view
here depends on the details of the geometry of classical spacetime physics. Indeed, there is
good (though perhaps not dispositive) reason to think that general relativity, for instance,
is not equivalent to a theory on which spacetime is flat, by any of the criteria discussed
here.22 More generally, I do not believe that it is a matter of convention whether we choose
one empirically equivalent theory over another. There are often very good reasons to think
one theory is better supported than or otherwise preferable to an empirically equivalent
alternative. Rather, the point is that in some cases, apparently different descriptions of the
world—such as a description on which spacetime is flat and one on which it is curved—
amount to the same thing, insofar as they have exactly the same capacities to represent
physical situations. In a sense, they say the same things about the world.
The suggestion developed in the last few paragraphs will worry some readers. Indeed,
one might be inclined to reject criterion 2 on the grounds that one has antecedent or even
a priori reason for thinking that there is, in all cases, an important distinction—perhaps
21There is a caveat worth mentioning: although spacetime is flat in all models of NG2, and thus in all
models, parallel transport of vectors is path independent, the result of parallel transporting any particular
vector along a given (fixed) curve will generally vary even between equivalent models, because the derivative
operator varies with gauge transformations. Thus one might think that GNG provides a more perspicuous
representation of spacetime geometry, since the geometrical facts are obscured by the gauge transformations
on NG2. (I am grateful to Oliver Pooley for pressing this point; Knox (2014) makes a closely related point.)
22See Knox (2011) and Weatherall and Manchak (2014) for evidence supporting this claim.
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a metaphysical distinction—between a theory that says spacetime is flat and one that says
spacetime is curved. Two theories that disagree in this regard could not both be true,
because at most one could accurately reflect the facts about the curvature of spacetime, and
thus, two such theories could not be equivalent. I think this position is probably tenable.
But it seems to me to get things backwards. At the very least, let me simply say that
there is another way of looking at matters, whereby one allows that the distinctions that
one can sensibly draw may depend on the structure of the world. And the our best guide to
understanding what those distinctions are will be to study the properties of and relationships
between our best physical theories.
Appendix A. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Prop. 5.1.
Suppose there were vector potentials Aa and A˜a such that [Aa] 6= [A˜a], but for every Xa ∈
[Aa], ∇[aXb] = ∇[aA˜b] = Fab. Then ∇[a(Xb] − A˜b]) = 0 for every Xa ∈ [Aa], and thus
Xa − A˜a is closed for every Xa ∈ [Aa]. Thus [Aa] ⊆ [A˜a]. A similar argument establishes
that [A˜a] ⊆ [Aa]. 
Proof of Prop. 5.2.
Suppose we have an isometry χ as described. Then for everyXa ∈ [Aa], we have χ∗(∇[aXb]) =
χ∗(Fab) = F ′ab. But exterior derivatives commute with pushforwards along diffeomorphisms,
and so χ∗(∇[aXb]) = ∇[aχ∗(Xb]) = F ′ab. Thus by Prop. 5.1, [χ∗(Aa)] = [A′a]. 
Proof of Prop. 5.4.
EM2 includes identity arrows, which are pairs of the form (1M , 0); (2) it contains all compo-
sitions of arrows, since given any two arrows (χ,Ga) and (χ
′, G′a) with appropriate domain
and codomain, (χ′, G′a)◦(χ,Ga) = (χ′◦χ, χ∗(G′a)+Ga) is also an arrow; and (3) composition
of arrows is associative, since given three pairs (χ,Ga), (χ
′, G′a), and (χ
′′, G′′a) with appropri-
ate domain and codomain, (χ′′, G′′a) ◦ ((χ′, G′a) ◦ (χ,Ga)) = (χ′′, G′′a) ◦ (χ′ ◦χ, χ∗(G′a) +Ga) =
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(χ′′ ◦ (χ′ ◦ χ), χ∗ ◦ χ′∗(G′′a) + χ∗(Ga)′ + Ga) = ((χ′′ ◦ χ′) ◦ χ, χ∗(χ′∗(G′′a) + G′a) + Ga) =
(χ′′ ◦ χ′, χ′∗(G′′a) +G′a) ◦ (χ,Ga) = ((χ′′, G′′a) ◦ (χ′, G′a)) ◦ (χ,Ga). 
Proof of Prop. 5.5.
It suffices to show that there is a functor from EM2 to EM1 that is full, faithful, and
essentially surjective, and which preserves Fab. Consider the functor E : EM2 → EM1
defined as follows: E acts on objects as (M, ηab, Aa) 7→ (M, ηab,∇[aAb]) and on arrows as
(χ,Ga) 7→ χ. This functor clearly preserves Fab. It is also essentially surjective, since given
any Fab, there always exists some Aa such that ∇[aAb] = Fab. Finally, to show that it is
full and faithful, we need to show that for any two objects (M, ηab, Aa) and (M, ηab, A
′
a), the
induced map on arrows between these models is bijective. First, suppose there exist two
distinct arrows (χ,Ga), (χ
′, G′a) : (M, ηab, Aa) → (M, ηab, A′a). If χ 6= χ′ we are finished, so
suppose for contradiction that χ = χ′. Since by hypothesis these are distinct arrows, it must
be that Ga 6= G′a. But then Aa +Ga 6= Aa +G′a, and so χ∗(Aa +Ga) 6= χ∗(Aa +G′a). So we
have a contradiction, and χ 6= χ′. Thus the induced map on arrows is injective. Now consider
an arrow χ : E((M, ηab, Aa))→ E((M, ηab, A′a)). This is an isometry such that χ∗(∇[aAb]) =
∇[aA′b]. It follows that χ∗(∇[aAb] − ∇[aχ∗(A′b])) = 0, and thus that ∇[aAb] − ∇[aχ∗(A′b])
is closed. So there is an arrow (χ, χ∗(A′a) − Aa) : (M, ηab, Aa) → (M, ηab, A′a) such that
E((χ, χ∗(A′a)− Aa)) = χ, and the induced map on arrows is surjective. 
Proof of Prop. 6.1.
This argument follows the proof of Prop. 5.5 closely. Consider the functor E : NG2 → NG1
defined as follows: E takes objects to their geometrizations, as in Prop. 2.1, and it acts on
arrows as (χ, ψ) 7→ χ. This functor preserves empirical content because the geometrization
lemma does; meanwhile, Prop. 2.2 ensures that the functor is essentially surjective. We
now show it is full and faithful. Consider any two objects A = (M, ta, h
ab,∇, ϕ) and A′ =
(M ′, t′a, h
′ab,∇′, ϕ). Suppose there exist distinct arrows (χ, ψ), (χ′, ψ′) : A→ A′, and suppose
(for contradiction) that χ = χ′. Then ψ 6= ψ′, since the arrows were assumed to be distinct.
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But then ϕ+ ψ 6= ϕ+ ψ′, and so (ϕ+ ψ) ◦ χ 6= (ϕ+ ψ′) ◦ χ. Thus χ 6= χ′ and E is faithful.
Now consider any arrow χ : E(A) → E(A′); we need to show that there is an arrow from
A to A′ that E maps to χ. I claim that the pair (χ, ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ) : A→ A′ is such an arrow.
Clearly if this arrow exists in NG2, E maps it to χ, so it only remains to show that this
arrow exists. First, observe that since χ is an arrow from E(A) to E(A′), χ : M → M ′ is a
diffeomorphism such that χ∗(ta) = t′a and χ∗(h
ab) = h′ab. Moreover, χ∗(ϕ+ (ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ)) =
χ∗(ϕ′◦χ) = ϕ′◦(χ◦χ−1) = ϕ′, so χ maps the gauge transformed potential associated with A
to the potential associated with A′. Now consider the action of χ on the derivative operator
∇. We need to show that for any tensor field λa1···arb1···bs , χ∗(∇˜nλa1···arb1···bs ) = ∇′nχ∗(λa1···arb1···bs ), where
∇˜ = (∇, tbtc∇a(ϕ′ ◦χ−ϕ)) is the gauge transformed derivative operator associated with A.
We will do this for an arbitrary vector field; the argument for general tensor fields proceeds
identically. Consider some vector field ξa. Then χ∗(∇˜nξa) = χ∗(∇nξa − tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ−
ϕ)) = χ∗(
g
∇nξa − tntmξm∇aϕ− tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ)) = χ∗(
g
∇nξa)− χ∗(tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ)),
where
g
∇ = (∇, tbtc∇aϕ) is the derivative operator associated with E(A). Now, we know
that χ : E(A) → E(A′) is an arrow of GNG, so χ∗(
g
∇nξa) =
g
∇nχ∗(ξa). Moreover, note
that the definitions of the relevant Cabc fields guarantee that ∇aλa1···arb1···bs =
g
∇a(λa1···arb1···bs ) and
similarly for ∇′ and
g
∇′. Thus we have χ∗(
g
∇nξa) − χ∗(tntmξm∇a(ϕ′ ◦ χ)) =
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa) −
t′nt
′
mχ∗(ξ
m)∇′a(ϕ′ ◦ (χ ◦ χ−1)) =
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa) − t′nt′mχ∗(ξm)∇′aϕ′ = ∇′nχ∗(ξa), where
g
∇′ =
(∇′,−tbtc∇aϕ′) is the derivative operator associated with E(A′). So χ does preserve the
gauge transformed derivative operator. The final step is to confirm that∇a∇b(ϕ′◦χ−ϕ) = 0.
To do this, again consider an arbitrary vector field ξa on M . We have just shown that
∇′aχ∗(ξb) − χ∗(∇aξb) = −χ∗(tatmξm∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ − ϕ). Now consider acting on both sides
of this equation with ∇′a. Beginning with the left hand side (and recalling that ∇ and
∇′ are both flat), we find: ∇′n∇′aχ∗(ξb) − ∇′nχ∗(∇aξb) = ∇′a
g
∇′nχ∗(ξb) − χ∗(∇a
g
∇nξb) =
g
∇′a
g
∇′nχ∗(ξa)−t′at′m(∇′bϕ′)
g
∇′nχ∗(ξm)−χ∗(
g
∇a
g
∇nξb)+χ∗(tatm(∇bϕ)
g
∇nξm) = χ∗(tatm(∇b(ϕ−
ϕ′ ◦ χ))
g
∇nξm). The right hand side, meanwhile, yields −∇′n(χ∗(tatmξm∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ − ϕ)) =
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χ∗(tatm(∇nξm)∇b(ϕ−ϕ′ ◦χ))+χ∗(tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ−ϕ′ ◦χ)). Comparing these, we conclude
that χ∗(tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ− ϕ′ ◦ χ)) = 0, and thus tatmξm∇n∇b(ϕ− ϕ′ ◦ χ) = 0. But since ta
is non-zero and this must hold for any vector field ξa, it follows that ∇a∇b(ϕ′ ◦ χ− ϕ) = 0.
Thus E is full. 
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